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Abstract: Electronic government innovations are one of the most important changes in public 
administration in recent years. Governments in many countries have implemented e-
government policies to foster efficiency and transparency, and to mitigate corruption. This 
paper explores the effects of e-government on corruption using longitudinal data for more than 
170 countries for the period 2002-2017. Empirical results strongly support the hypothesis that 
e-government can be used to deter corruption. This result is robust to alternative indicators of 
corruption and e-government, as well as to a variety of estimation techniques. A novelty of our 
research is that we analyse under which conditions is e-government more effective in reducing 
corruption. Quantile regressions indicate that the potential of e-government to deter corruption 
is higher between quantiles 0.3 to 0.8 of the corruption distribution. E-government also reveals 
to be a more effective corruption deterrent in countries that are not classified as high-income 
countries and that are not in the extremes of the freedom of the press variable distribution. 
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1. Introduction 
 In the last decades, the fast development of the Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT) has made the adoption of electronic government (e-government)1 solutions 
a worldwide political trend (UNDESA, 2016).2 The promotion of stronger institutions, through 
greater transparency in government, more accountable public officials and the engagement of 
citizens in public matters, has frequently been used to justify investments in e-government. 
Additionally, e-government is perceived as being capable of discouraging corrupt practices and 
influencing citizens’ attitudes towards corruption (Elbahnasawy, 2014; Gans-Morse et al., 2018). 
Digital records improve the quality and make the data of transactions easier to maintain, 
facilitating their track and the detection of malpractice acts. Consequently, audits and 
preventive checks become more efficient. Moreover, movements such as the open government 
data increase citizens’ and media’s awareness on several domains of the public servants’ 
activities, namely on public contracts and tenders, increasing accountability and the chances of 
detecting corrupt practices.  
This paper empirically assesses whether e-government can be used to deter corruption 
and under which conditions it is more powerful in reducing it. We believe our analysis is 
important for several reasons. First, corruption is a serious problem in many countries, imposing 
severe negative effects on society, namely by harming innovation (Murphy et al., 1993; Shleifer 
                                               
1 Despite de non-existence of a standard definition of e-government, the United Nations (UN) E-
Government Survey of 2014 defines it as the use and application of information technologies on public 
administration to streamline and integrate processes, to effectively manage data and information, to 
enhance public service delivery and to expand communication channels for engagement and 
empowerment of people (UNDESA, 2014). 
2 In Europe, the European Commission has been advising member states to adopt electronic ID, 
interoperability and e-certification, among others, to promote transparency and accountability, and to 
reduce administrative burdens (European Commission, 2016). 
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and Vishny, 1993; Dincer, 2019), economic growth and sustainable development (Mauro, 1995; 
Murphy et al., 1991; Aidt, 2009; d’Agostino et al., 2016; Gründler and Potrafke, 2019). More 
corrupt countries tend to attract less foreign investment (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002), tax trade 
(Dutt and Traca, 2010), have higher public debts (Cooray et al., 2017), a less developed financial 
sector (Cooray and Schneider, 2018) and a lower private investment (Zakharov, 2019). Second, 
large investments have been made on e-government, and therefore it is important to measure 
its benefits (and costs) for society. Third, we have built a large and detailed database comprising 
more than 170 countries and 16 years of data, which includes several proxies for corruption and 
e-government, as well as other economic and institutional variables, which allow us to obtain 
robust empirical results. Despite the relevance of the topic, only a few studies have used panel 
data to investigate the relationship between e-government and corruption and those studies 
are largely focused on average effects. Finally, we analyse under which conditions is e-
government more effective in reducing corruption. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the determinants 
of corruption and discusses the role of e-government as a corruption mitigation tool. Section 3 
describes the data and its sources. Section 4 explains the empirical methodology and section 5 
presents the empirical results. Finally, the conclusion is presented in section 6.  
 
2. Determinants of corruption and the role of electronic government  
An extensive literature has analysed the causes and effects of corruption,3 showing that 
countries with high levels of corruption are associated with high bureaucracy and low levels of 
education, income and development. However, no consensus has been reached on the causes 
of corruption. In the following lines, we briefly review the literature on the determinants of 
corruption. 
                                               
3 See Dimant and Tosato (2018) and Aidt (2018) for a survey. 
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Institutions and historical evolution play an important role in explaining a country’s 
development and corruption levels. More politically and economically inclusive countries, that 
promote political participation and defend private property, tend to exhibit the highest levels of 
social and economic development (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). The type of colonization may 
also influence long-run rates of development and the geographic dispersion of corruption 
(Acemoglu et al., 2001).4 Whether or not a country is a democracy, and its type of democratic 
regime, may also influence corruption. Autocracies and recent democracies tend to exhibit 
higher levels of corruption. Recent democracies tend to have fragile institutions and free entry 
into the collection of bribes by the agencies that provide public goods, which contributes to 
higher corruption levels (Shleifer and Vishy, 1993). Additionally, there is evidence that cultural 
and social norms related to corruption are quite persistent and that legal enforcement matters 
in government officials’ corruption decisions (Fisman and Miguel, 2007). 
The lack of competition and government regulations may also yield more corruption 
(Pieroni and d’Agostino, 2013), as they can create an environment conducive to bribes 
generating higher rents for existing firms, and therefore higher incentives to bribe bureaucrats 
that control the rights of firms (Ades and Di Tella, 1999). Hence, openness to foreign companies 
and antitrust regulation can result in lower levels of corruption (Torrez, 2002). Bureaucracy is 
also presented as an important factor influencing the aggregate level of corruption since heavy 
and intrusive regulations may create higher incentives for bribes or for not fulfilling the legal 
requirements (Djankov et al., 2002; Auriol and Walters, 2005; Dal Bó et al., 2006). Finally, 
freedom of the press has also been shown to deter corrupt activities (Brunetti and Weder, 2003).  
                                               
4 The authors distinguish extractive colonization from inclusive colonization. Most countries where 
European colonizers set up extractive institutions have lower income levels today. Those countries are 
located near the Equator, where colonizers faced very high mortality rates.   
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 During the last decades, innovations in information and communication technologies 
and their adoption by governments had an unprecedented impact on society and the way the 
public sector operates (Scholl, 2012).5 Higher levels of access to information and of social media 
penetration help to promote accountability and to discipline corruption by exposing 
wrongdoings, particularly in less democratic countries, where traditional media is often 
censored  (DiRienzo et al., 2007; Jha and Sarangi, 2017; Enikolopov et al., 2018). E-government 
and technology can impact corruption both by increasing the probability of conviction and the 
punishment per offence. Since electronic records are easier to store and access, e-government 
facilitates audits, preventive checks and ongoing investigations of corrupt acts, increasing the 
probability of exposure. Interoperability and integration of public services across agencies can 
also have the same effect. Additionally, digital information regarding corrupt acts is easier to 
disseminate, increasing the reputational damages for the individuals that commit them, making 
the punishment harsher. Recent trends such as open government and open data that promote 
transparency and collaboration may also reduce corruption by increasing citizens’ ability to 
detect corrupt activities (Olken, 2009).   
 As far as we know, only a few studies (Andersen, 2009; Elbahnasawy, 2014; and Zhao 
and Xu, 2015) have empirically investigated the impact of e-government on corruption, using 
panel data for a large number of countries. Most of these studies use data that does not cover 
the last decade and they do not extensively investigate which factors condition the mitigating 
effect of e-government on corruption levels.  
This paper improves on the previous literature for several reasons. First, we have built 
a large and detailed dataset that covers more than 170 countries, spans for more than a decade 
                                               
5 See Andersen et al. (2010) for a meta-analysis of the literature on e-government’s impacts. For example, 
Veiga and Rohman (2017) and Elbahnasawy (2021) suggest that e-government decreases the size of the 
shadow economy, while Martins and Veiga (2018) reveal that it can facilitate business. 
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of e-government innovations, and includes several measures of corruption and e-government. 
As far as we know, this is the most comprehensive database ever used, which allows for 
robustness tests on several sub-samples and to cover the most recent innovations in e-
government. Second, we have used several alternative measures of corruption and e-
government, which reduce the potential biases resulting from a single measure.6 Third, by 
considering different measures of e-government, that capture different dimensions of the 
general concept, we are able to explore which e-government dimensions (e.g. open data, pre-
filled forms, e-government users) are more closely linked to corruption outcomes, which is 
clearly an under-researched topic. Fourth, we have tested the robustness of our results to a 
variety of estimation techniques, namely the maximum likelihood estimators that are 
particularly well-suited to deal with censored dependent variables. We have also used quantile 
regressions to explore whether the potential of e-government as an anti-corruption tool varies 
along with the conditional distribution of corruption outcomes. Finally, we investigated under 
which conditions is e-government more effective to deter corruption, which is a gap in the 
literature. 
 
3. The data  
Four alternative corruption indexes are used as proxies for corruption: The Control of 
Corruption Index (CCI) from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) compiled by Transparency International, the index of 
corruption of the International Country Risk Guide (IC_ICRG) from the PRS Group and the Public 
                                               
6 As corruption consists of illegal activities, which are hard to measure and document, a major difficulty 
of studies on corruption is measurement. Most empirical studies use indicators of perceived corruption 
as a proxy for corruption, which have been shown to be positively correlated with measures of actual 
corruption and to contain real information on corrupt practices (Olken, 2009). 
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Sector Corruption Index (PSCI) by the V-Dem Institute. The CCI measures the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, considering both grand and petty forms of corruption, 
as well as the degree of state’s capture by elites and private interests. The CCI aggregates 
indicators that combine the views of firms, citizens and experts obtained through surveys 
implemented in industrial and developing countries.7 The CPI attempts to measure perceptions 
of corruption in the public sector by aggregating indicators from several data sources.8 The 
IC_ICRG corruption index is a measure of corruption within the political system. Although it also 
takes financial forms of corruption into account, such as bribes, it is more focused on political 
forms of corruption such as job reservations, suspicious ties between business and politics, 
secret party funding, nepotism, exchange of favours or excessive patronage. Its construction is 
based on a subjective analysis of the political risks and information on financial and economic 
data by the IC_ICRG staff. Finally, the PSCI is solely focused on public sector corruption. It aims 
to capture the extent to which civil servants grant favours in exchange for bribes and kickbacks, 
defalcate, steal or use public resources for private use. The V-Dem Institute indicators combine 
factual information from official documents with subjective assessments from experts. As can 





To measure the development of electronic government in each country we start by 
using the UNDESA’s E-government Development Index (EGDI) and its components, which are 
                                               
7 For a detailed description of the methodology see Kaufmann et al. (2011). 
8 For more details see the “Technical methodology note” and the “Source description” available at 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016.  
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narrower in scope. The EGDI is released biannually and is based both on primary data, from 
surveys implemented by UNDESA, and on secondary data from the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) and UNESCO. It covers 193 countries and is calculated as an 
arithmetic average of three sub-indexes: The Online Services Index (OSI), the 
Telecommunications Infrastructure Index (TII) and the Human Capital Index (HCI).9 A subset of 
the OSI, focused on electronic participation related features, the e-Participation Index (EPart), is 
also made available. The EPart considers “the use of online services to facilitate the provision of 
information by governments to citizens (“e-information sharing”), interaction with stakeholders 
(“e-consultation”) and engagement in decision-making processes (“e-decision-making”)” 
(UNDESA, 2016; pp.141). 
Besides the measures of e-government development, we consider other variables that 
previous literature has shown to be relevant to analyse corruption. The first is the log of the GDP 
per capita (logGDP) that, according to Treisman (2007), is the strongest predictor of corruption. 
Data for this variable was obtained from the World Bank’s Development Indicators. 
Alternatively, we have also used dummy variables that assign each country to a certain income 
level (Low Income, Lower Middle Income, Upper Middle Income and High Income), based on the 
World Bank’s Income Classification. 
A second economic dimension considered is the degree of openness of the economy 
(openness), that measures the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP. As more 
open economies have fewer monopolistic rents and are more exposed to external competitors, 
                                               
9 The TII is a weighted average of five indicators related to the use and development of 
telecommunications. The HCI is a weighted average of four schooling and literacy-related indicators. The 
OSI measures the development of governmental online services provided in each country and is based on 
an evaluation made through a survey by researchers from all over the world. The evaluated features 
include online service delivery, government approaches as a whole, open government data, multi-channel 
service delivery, e-participation mobile services, usage up-take, digital divide and innovative partnerships 
using ICT. 
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we expect them to be more transparent and less corrupt (Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Dutt 2009). 
The same reasoning applies to foreign direct investment inflows as a percentage of GDP (fdi). 
These two variables were collected from the WB’s Development Indicators, as well as the 
percentage of urban population (urban). To proxy the level of bureaucracy, we follow Djankov 
et al. (2002) and use the Ease of Starting a Business Index (easestartbus) from the World Bank 
Ease of Doing Business project. We also consider the fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 
people (broadband) from the WB’s WDI.  
Democracy, freedom, and political institutions can be important predictors of 
corruption (Persson et al., 2003; Lederman et al., 2005). To capture individual freedom and 
political rights we use the Political Rights variable (political_rights) from the Freedom House’s 
Freedom in the World database, which is an index that ranges from 1 (greatest degree of 
freedom) to 7 (lower degree of freedom). This variable is based on external analysts’ on-the-
ground research, media information analysis and interaction with local contacts and considers 
the electoral process, the political pluralism and participation and the functioning of 
government. We also include in the analysis the Freedom of the Press Index by Reports Without 
Borders (pressfree).  
Finally, from the World Religion Dataset, we take the percentages of Catholic population 
(chatholic), Islamic population (islam) and Protestant population (protestant).10 These variables 
are used to proxy cultural norms that may influence corruption (Fisman and Miguel, 2007). We 
have also considered dummy variables that identify the continent and the colonial origins of the 
countries. 
                                               
10 Values for these variables exist for every five years, starting in 1945 and ending in 2010. The series were 
interpolated using the Stata ipolate command. 
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Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis, for 
the entire sample period (2002 to 2016).11 To have all the variables in a similar scale and to 
facilitate the interpretation of the estimated coefficients we have rescaled the open_budget, 
CCI, CPI, IC_ICRG, easestartbus, rule_law, political_rights and pressfree to a 0 to 1 scale. For 
similar purposes, we have inverted the CCI, CPI and IC_ICRG so that higher scores represent 
higher levels of corruption, and the political_rights and pressfree so that higher scores represent, 




4. Empirical methodology 
 We start by performing a cross-country analysis for the most recent year for which the 
data on corruption and e-government indexes is available. The baseline empirical model can be 
presented as follows: 
𝐶𝐼#$  = 𝛽& + 𝛽'𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑣#$,' + γ.𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙′#,$,'+ 𝜀#$      (1) 
where t equals 2016 and i represents a country. CI stands for the corruption index (either the 
CCI, the CPI, the IC_ICRG or PSCI) and egov for the e-government index. Control’ represents a 
vector of control variables, lagged one period to minimize endogeneity concerns. b0, b1 and γ 
are, respectively, coefficients and a vector of coefficients to be estimated. Finally, e is the error 
term.   
                                               
11 During the 2002-2016 period, some countries (e.g.: Serbia and Montenegro, Sudan) were divided or 
suffered major redefinitions of their borders. These countries were removed from the sample. We did not 
consider 2017 in the descriptive statistics because this year is only considered in complementary 
regressions.  
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In the baseline model, we use as proxies for corruption and e-government the Control 
of Corruption Index from the World Bank (CCI), and the Online Service Index (OSI) from the 
United Nations, respectively. These are the indexes from which more observations are available 
and, among the e-government indexes analysed, the OSI is the one that is more closely related 
to the strict definition of e-government. The OSI is lagged one period to avoid endogeneity 
biases resulting from a possible influence of corruption on e-government maturity (Bussel, 2011; 
Khan and Krishnan, 2019).  
Initially, we used a parsimonious set of control variables consisting of the log of the GDP 
per capita (logGDP), the degree of openness of the economy (openness), the political rights 
index (political_rights) and the ease of starting a business index (easestartbus).12 In subsequent 
regressions, to verify if the results were sensitive to the control variables selected, we used the 
remaining variables, discussed in the previous section, as possible determinants of corruption.13   
Given that we are using indexes as dependent variables and all the indexes were 
rescaled to range from 0 to 1, we have used the fractional probit method. As explained earlier, 
we have used the one-year lagged value of the OSI to mitigate possible endogeneity problems. 
To be even more cautious, we also estimate the cross-section model using Two-Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS). In the first stage, we instrument the OSI and in the second stage, we use the 
estimated values for the instrumented variable as an explanatory variable for corruption.14 
                                               
12 An alternative proxy is the index of Bureaucracy Quality from the ICRG, but this variable is only available 
for a smaller group of countries. 
13 Besides these variables, several other variables (economic, demographic, political and institutional) 
were tested in preliminary analyses but ended up being excluded because they created multicollinearity 
problems or had fewer observations and did not increase the explanatory power of the model. 
14 The instruments should be uncorrelated with the error term (exogeneity condition) and correlated with 
the instrumented variable (relevance condition). We have relied upon several statistical tests to validate 
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Following Andersen (2009), we start by using as instruments of e-government development the 
percentage of the population living in urban areas (urban) and the fixed broadband penetration 
of the population (broadband).15 ICT adoption costs are lower in more densely populated urban 
areas, while broadband penetration is important for accessing the internet. Therefore, countries 
with higher broadband penetration and more people living in urban areas have more incentives 
to develop e-government, given the lower costs of adoption and the higher number of potential 
users. Complementing the 2SLS estimations, we also use lagged values of e-gov as instruments 
since while it is possible to argue that corruption can influence current e-government maturity, 
the same does not hold for past values of e-government development. Additionally, past values 
of e-government development are good predictors of the current one. 
To extract the full potential of the large database built, we have extended the empirical 
analysis to panel data regressions. The panel covers the years for which values of the OSI are 
available: 2002, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013 and 2015. The panel data model can be 
represented by equation (2): 
𝐶𝐶𝐼#$  = 𝛽& + 𝛽'𝑂𝑆𝐼#$,' + γ.𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙′#$,' + 𝜆$ + 𝜇#  + 𝜀#$ (2) 
that adds to equation (2) 𝜆$ and 𝜇#  that represents time and country fixed effects, respectively 
and allows t to assume different years. Aiming to investigate which e-government dimensions 
can be more helpful to deter corruption, we make use of our panel to explore the relationship 
between corruption outcomes and alternative measures of e-government. Namely, we use the 
European Commission Digital Public Services Index, which we will explain later, in section 5.2. 
                                               
our procedure: the underidentification test, the weak identification test and the Sargan-Hansen test of 
overidentifying restrictions. 
15 Andersen (2009) uses the telephone line density, but we believe that given the technological progress, 
nowadays it is preferable to use the broadband penetration. 
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 Finally, we investigate under which conditions is e-government more powerful in 
reducing corruption. Motivated by the fact that the average corruption levels of high-income 
countries and the remaining ones are very different, we analyse if the impact of the e-
government on corruption depends on the level of GDP. To investigate if the effect of the OSI 
on CCI varies with GDP levels, we start by splitting (according to the World Bank’s income 
classification) the sample into two groups, where one group includes high income countries and 
the other group is formed by the remaining countries. With the same purpose, we estimate, for 
the full sample, the average marginal effects of the OSI on the conditional mean of the CCI for 
different levels of GDP per capita. Besides the GDP, we also study if freedom of the press has a 
mediating effect on the impact of e-government on corruption levels. Finally, to investigate the 
determinants of corruption along with the conditional distribution of the corruption index score, 
we estimate panel data quantile regressions. We follow the approach proposed by Machado 
and Santos Silva (2019) for quantile regressions with fixed effects. This approach improves on 
the previous literature by allowing the time-invariant individual effect to have different impacts 
on different regions of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable, instead of treating 




5.1. Cross-section results 
As explained earlier, we started by estimating the model with the fractional probit 
method, with robust standard errors, for the year of 2016. Table 3 presents the estimation 
results for the marginal effects using the CCI as the dependent variable. Column 1 shows results 
for the baseline model that uses a parsimonious set of control variables. In column 2, the 
percentages of Catholic (Catholic), Islamic (Islamic) and Protestant (Protestant) population are 
 13 
added and in column 3 the freedom of the press (pressfree) is also included.16 As endogeneity 
of the e-government index is a potential concern, we proceeded by replacing the first lag of the 
OSI by its third lag (column 4) and by estimating 2SLS regressions. Column 5 reports the 
estimations in which the first lags of the broadband penetration and urban population are used 
as instruments, while column 6 shows the estimations in which lags of the OSI are used as 
instruments. 
 Estimation results presented in Table 3 show that higher levels of the OSI are associated 
with better corruption outcomes, supporting our main hypothesis. In all models, the OSI turned 
out to be positively signed and strongly statistically significant. There is also strong support for 
the hypotheses that GDP growth, the degree of openness of the economy,17 and political rights 
and civil liberties reduce corruption. On the contrary, our proxy for bureaucracy, the ease of 
doing business index, never turned out to be statistically significant. Regarding religion, results 
suggest that a higher percentage of protestants is associated with less corruption. Finally, we 
find strong support for the hypothesis that freedom of the press prevents corruption practices. 
This variable was not initially included in the regressions because it has fewer observations. 
Given that the pressfree and political_rights variables exhibit a correlation of 0.68 it is not 
surprising that the inclusion of the former leads to a significant drop in the estimated coefficients 
associated with the latter. 
 
                                               
16 In preliminary estimations, we also included five dummies for the colonial origins of the countries: 
countries that were never colonized and countries colonized by Spain, Great Britain, France and other 
countries (e.g. Belgium, Portugal, the Netherlands). The results remained essentially the same.  
17 Besides the degree of openness of the economy, we also included in preliminary estimations a variable 
for foreign direct investment inflows (Torrez, 2002), to further test for positive effects of exposure to 





Two robustness tests were implemented.18 First, using the model of column 3 from 
Table 3, cross-section regressions for the other years were estimated. As in the regression for 
2016, the OSI’s coefficient turned out to be negative and statistically significant in the remaining 
years. LogGDP, political_rights, protestants and pressfree also turned out to be statistically 
significant in all, or in most, of the remaining years. Second, following Brunetti and Weder (2003) 
we estimated a cross-section regression where the dependent variable is the five-year average 
of the perceived corruption index. This procedure avoids the potential problem of cross-section 
estimation results being influenced by shocks that affect perceived corruption in a specific year. 
Under this approach, the OSI’s coefficient is still negative and significant, with a magnitude that 
is almost identical to the one obtained under the baseline approach. 
 
Alternative measures of Corruption 
Table 4 presents estimation results for models using the fractional probit and the same 
explanatory variables as in column 3 of Table 3, for the four alternative variables that can be 
used to proxy the level of corruption: the Control of Corruption Index (CCI) from the World 
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) compiled by 
Transparency International, the assessment of corruption of the International Country Risk 
Guide (IC_ICRG) from the PRS Group and the Public Sector Corruption Index (PSCI) compiled by 
the V-Dem Institute. As can be seen from Table 4, regardless of the corruption measure used, 
the OSI is always statistically significant, confirming that e-government can be used as a tool to 
deter corruption. Given that the PSCI is less correlated with the CCI than the CPI and the IC_ICRG, 
it is not surprising that the magnitude and the statistical significance of the OSI’s estimated 
                                               
18 Results are available from the authors upon request. 
 15 
coefficient differs more from the one where the CCI is the dependent variable (column 1) when 
the PSCI is the dependent variable (column 4) than when the CPI or the IC_ICRG are the 




5.2. Panel results for the whole sample 
The results of the estimation of panel data fractional probit models including the year 
and country dummies to control for time and country fixed effects are reported in Table 5.19 To 
facilitate the interpretation of the results, marginal effects are reported. The first three columns 
replicate, with panel data, the models of columns 2 to 4 of Table 3. Results once again reveal a 
negative relationship between progress in electronic government and corruption, regardless of 
whether we use the first or the third lag of the variable OSI. However, the size of the estimated 
coefficients associated with the OSI in Table 5 is significantly smaller than those reported in Table 
3, suggesting that the cross-section estimations overestimate the effect of e-government on 
corruption. There is also strong evidence that GDP per capita and political rights reduce 
corruption levels. When using panel data, and controlling for country and time effects, the 
variables capturing the degree of openness of the economy and the freedom of the press stop 
being statistically significant. Since the variable pressfree did not turn out as statistically 
significant and fewer observations are available for this variable, it was excluded from the 
subsequent regressions.  
                                               
19 The variable easestartbus was not included in the regressions of Table 5 because it is not available for 
the first two years of the panel (2002 and 2003) and it never turned out to be statistically significant. 
Religion-related variables were also not included because these variables show a low within variation and 
we control for country fixed effects in the panel estimations. The pressfree variable is not available for 
2002. 
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We then considered alternative measures of e-government, namely the e-government 
development index (EGDI) and the e-participation index (EPart), both provided by UNDESA. The 
EGDI, as previously explained, is a broader measure of e-government than the OSI. Besides the 
Online Service Index, the EGDI also considers the Telecommunications Infrastructure Index and 
the Human Capital Index. The EPart is a subset of the OSI that aims to capture the citizens’ access 
to information without demand, their possibility of engaging in decision making and 
empowerment through co-design and co-production of policies and services. Therefore, it is a 
narrower measure of e-government than the OSI. The marginal effects of the fractional probit 
estimates of models including these two variables are reported in columns 4 and 5 of Table 5. 
The magnitude of the estimated coefficient associated with the broader measure of e-
government (EGDI) is larger than the estimated coefficient associated with the OSI, suggesting 
that human capital and telecommunication infrastructures also play a role in deterring 
corruption. However, the variable EPart, which is a narrower measure of e-government, did not 
turn out as statistically significant indicating that e-participation tools per se may not be enough 




Finally, we have used the European Commission’s Digital Public Services indicators, to 
further explore alternative measures of e-government. These are a subset of the Digital 
Economy and Society Index (DESI) of the European Commission and have the advantage of being 
computed on a yearly basis and of being disaggregated into several distinct e-government 
components, namely e-government Users, Pre-Filled Forms, Online Service Completion and 
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Digital Public Services for Business.20 These indicators allow us to investigate which e-
government-related domains have a higher impact on corruption. The drawback is that they are 
available, at best, from 2014 and for the European Union member states (28 countries), which 
are typically high-income and low-corruption countries. Given these limitations, the estimation 
results using the DESI indicators should be interpreted with caution.  
Table 6 shows the marginal effects of estimations using the fractional probit model and 
the first lag of the DESI indicators of e-government for which at least four years of data are 
available. Given the low number of observations, country fixed effects were not included.21 
However, to account for correlation between errors of the same country, standard errors were 
clustered by country. Control variables are the same as those used in the estimation results 
presented in column 2 of Table 5.  
Results presented in Table 6, support the idea that a higher percentage of e-government 
users and more digital public services for business and online service completion mitigate 
corruption. This is not surprising given that the three indicators signal a greater use of online 
rather than face-to-face interactions, therefore reducing the proximity between individuals and 
potentially corrupt civil servants. Higher online service completion and digital public services for 
business reduce the extent to which civil servants have discretionary power on bureaucratic 
processes, and therefore, may decrease the likelihood of corrupt behaviour. A higher 
percentage of e-government users also suggests that more people are informed about the public 
sector and can act as whistle-blowers of corruption. No statistically significant effects were 
found for the pre-filled forms component. 
                                               
20 Additional dimensions which have also been included in the index are Open Data and eHealth Services, 
but these dimensions were not included in the analysis due to the small number of observations. 
21 In initial regressions, time dummies were also included, but they were never statistically significant and 





5.3. Under which conditions is e-government more powerful in reducing corruption? 
The mitigating effects of e-government on corruption may depend upon several conditions. This 
section starts by analysing possible mediating effects of GDP and freedom of the press on the 
marginal effects of e-government on corruption levels. It then investigates the effects of e-
government at different levels of corruption. 
 
Mediating effects of the explanatory variables 
High-income countries exhibit much lower corruption levels (average CCI = 0.271) than 
non-high-income countries (average CCI = 0.597).22 Therefore, one might expect the relationship 
between e-government and corruption to differ between these two groups of countries. To 
investigate this hypothesis, we split the sample into two and we estimated fractional probit 
panel models with country and time fixed effects for both groups, as well as a model for the full 
sample including an interaction variable between the logGDP and the OSI. Results for the 
estimated marginal effects are reported in Table 7. The variable pressfree was not included 




                                               
22 Although the World Bank classifies countries in four income groups (Low Income, Lower Middle Income 
Upper Middle Income, and High Income), we have split the sample in just two groups because there is a 
significant difference between high-income countries and the remaining ones in terms of corruption 
outcomes. Differences in corruption levels are much smaller among the remaining income groups. 
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As can be seen from columns 1 and 2 of Table 7, the OSI is only marginally statistically 
significant in the sub-sample of countries that are classified as high-income countries by the 
World Bank, but it is highly statistically significant in the sample with the remaining countries. 
Column 3, that presents the results for the full sample of a regression including an interaction 
term between the OSI and the logGDP, reveals that the estimated coefficient for the interaction 
terms is positive and statistically significant. To further analyse how the effect of e-government 
on corruption varies according to levels of GDP per capita, Figure 1 shows the average marginal 
effects of l.OSI on the conditional mean of the CCI. The figure indicates that for levels of GDP per 
capita below around 9,897 USD (logGDP = 9.2), e-government can be used to mitigate 




Press freedom is also likely to influence the ability of e-government to reduce corruption 
by magnifying scandals in case of wrong-doing by public servants. To test this hypothesis, we 
estimated the average marginal effects of e-government on the conditional mean of the 
corruption levels for different levels of the variable pressfree. Results presented in Figure 2 
reveal that only for the extreme values of pressfree, below 0.4 and above 0.9, e-government 
does not reduce corruption. If we consider that values of pressfree below 0.4 correspond to the 
lowest 5% values of the distribution and above 0.9 to the highest 10%, the former result is not 
surprising. In countries where media freedom is extremely low, investments in e-government 
without other complementary measures is not likely to have a significant impact on reducing 
corruption. Furthermore, in nations where media freedom is extremely high, e-government may 





The effects of e-government at different levels of corruption 
To further explore the relationship between progress in e-government and corruption 
levels, we have estimated quantile regressions, which allow for an analysis of the relationship 
between the CCI and the OSI along with the conditional distribution of the CCI. Table 8 presents 
the estimation results for quantile regressions with fixed effects, using the approach proposed 
by Machado and Santos Silva (2019). As our panel has a relatively high ratio of countries over 
time periods, we have used the Jacknife bias correction of Dhaene and Jochmans (2015).23 
Results are reported for quantiles 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75. The OSI’s coefficient is statistically 
significant for the quantiles 0.5 and 0.75 of the CCI conditional distribution, where typically non-
high-income countries are located,24 but not for the quantile 0.25. When exploring in higher 
detail the regions of the CCI’s conditional distribution in which the OSI’s coefficient is statistically 
significant, we have found that it is statistically significant, approximately, from quantile 0.3 to 
quantile 0.8.25 This reveals that online government solutions are less effective in reducing 
corruption in the extremes of the distribution, that is, when corruption levels are very high or 
very low. In more corrupt countries, investments in e-government alone may not be enough to 
mitigate the problem, unless they are accompanied by other initiatives to fight corruption, 
namely policies aimed at strengthening institutions, increasing the digital literacy of the 
population, and improving ICT infrastructures. On the other extreme, in less corrupt countries, 
additional progress in the corruption levels is hard to attain and, typically, these countries 
                                               
23 As a rule of thumb, Machado and Silva (2019) advise implementing this correction whenever the ratio 
between the number of individuals and the number of time periods is greater than 10. 
24 There is a positive correlation between corruption and income levels. 
25 A p-value of 0.092 is found for q=0.3 and a p-value of 0.099 is found for q=0.8. 
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 As mentioned earlier, the Dhaene and Jochmans (2015) jacknife bias correction was 
used in the estimations presented in Table 8. Nevertheless, as a robustness test, we also 
estimated the same regressions without this correction, obtaining very similar results. An 
additional robustness test was to include the freedom of the press (pressfree) as an independent 
variable.26 The OSI variable remained statistically significant for the quantiles 0.5 and 0.75 and 
non-statistically significant for the quantile 0.25. The absolute value of the magnitude of the 
coefficients in quantiles 0.5 and 0.75 increased, both when applying and not applying the 
jacknife bias correction. 
 
6. Conclusions  
Corruption is a global and major problem that reduces trust in government and imposes 
severe negative consequences on society. Countries with lower corruption levels use their 
resources more efficiently, attract more investment and grow faster. Therefore, the design of 
successful anti-corruption policies is a major challenge across the world. This requires a 
concerted action by the various groups in society (the government, the private sector, citizens, 
and civil society organizations) and an interdisciplinary approach that takes advantage of the 
latest technological progress. E-government tools may be used to obtain, scrutinize, and share 
data to prevent, detect, and restrain corrupt behaviour.  
                                               
26 This variable is only included as a robustness test because it is only available from 2003 onwards, leading 
to a loss of observations in the regressions. 
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Using longitudinal data for more than 170 countries and data from 2002 to 2017, this 
paper analyses if electronic government tools can be used to deter corruption. Empirical results 
strongly support the hypothesis that e-government reduces corruption levels. This result is 
robust to several econometric techniques, as well as to different proxies of corruption and e-
government. Since corruption comes in different forms and is difficult to measure, we use four 
alternative proxies of corruption proposed by major international organizations. Corruption can 
be tackled in different ways, so we examine which e-government domains are more successful 
in reducing it. Using data for E.U. countries, there is evidence that a higher percentage of e-
government users, more digital public services for business and a higher degree of online service 
completion reduces corruption. This conclusion is preliminary, as this data on e-government is 
still scarce. However, as more years of data are released, this question deserves further 
investigation as it is critical to the definition of e-government strategies capable of confronting 
corruption.  
Previous studies on the relationship between e-government and corruption (Andersen, 
2009; Elbahnasawy, 2014; Zhao and Xu, 2015) mainly focused on average effects. A contribution 
of this paper is to analyse if the capacity of e-government to restrain corruption is different at 
different levels of GDP, freedom of the press and corruption. The results indicate that the 
potential of e-government as an anti-corruption tool is larger in countries that are not high-
income countries, that are not in the extremes of the freedom of the press variable and in those 
situated in quantiles 0.3 to 0.8 of the corruption distribution. In countries with very low levels 
of corruption, achieving further progress is difficult and these countries typically already have 
sophisticated e-government systems. On the other extreme, in countries where corruption is 
very high, innovative technologies to strengthen public sector performance and confront 
corruption have a lower likelihood of effectiveness probably because most of these countries 
also have low educational levels of the population, lack of appropriate infrastructures and weak 
institutions. In sum, our results suggest that although e-government alone may not be enough 
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to curb corruption, when properly integrated in a correct strategy, it can be used to successfully 
address corruption and help to foster greater trust and accountability in government. 
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Table 1 - Correlation between the four corruption indexes (year: 2016) 
 CCI CPI IC_ICRG PSCI 
CCI 1    
CPI 0.993 1   
IC_ICRG 0.967 0.965 1  





Table 2 - Descriptive statistics (2002-2016) 
Variable  Mean sd Obs 
EGDI overall 0.431 0.218 N=1536 
 between  0.203 n=194 
 within  0.079  
OSI overall 0.351 0.254 N=1536 
 between  0.226 n=194 
 within  0.116  
E-Part overall 0.239 0.260 N=1536 
 between  0.204 n=194 
 within  0.163  
e-government Users overall 0.603 0.193 N=78 
 between  0.186 n=27 
 within  0.055  
Pre-Filled Forms overall 0.475 0.268 N=84 
 between  0.266 n=28 
 within  0.052  
Online Service Completion overall 0.760 0.156 N=84 
 between  0.152 n=28 
 within  0.043  
Digital Public Services for Business overall 0.716 0.162 N=84 
 between  0.154 n=28 
 within  0.056  
CCI overall 0.500 0.200 N=3114 
 between  0.197 n=212 
 within  0.036  
CPI* overall 0.429 0.198 N=872 
 between  0.196 n=180 
 within  0.019  
IC_ICRG overall 0.568 0.195 N=2081 
 between  0.186 n=139 
 within  0.060  
PSCI overall 0.509 0.302 N=2493 
 between  0.297 n=168 
 within  0.060  
logGDP overall 8.598 1.528 N=2963 
 between  1.544 n=201 
 within  0.145  
openness overall 94.033 59.676 N=2830 
 between  55.058 n=197 
 within  22.468  
fdi overall 6.33 23.466 N=2834 
 between  43.354 N=193 
 within  14.443  
urban overall 55.541 23.567 N=2863 
 between  23.581 n=193 
 within  2.034  
easestartbus overall 0.724 0.191 N=2322 
 between  0.164 n=189 
 within  0.099  
broadband overall 8.945 11.601 N=2658 
 between  9.955 n=204 
 within  5.926  
political_rights overall 0.522 0.306 N=2887 
 between  0.299 n=194 
 30 
 within  0.073  
pressfree overall 0.726 0.162 N=2396 
 between  0.145 n= 178 
 within  0.071  
catholic overall 0.286 0.312 N=2866 
 between  0.311 n=192 
 within  0.031  
islam overall 0.241 0.357 N=2866 
 between  0.357 n=192 
 within  0.0197  
protestant overall 0.147 0.204 N=2866 
 between  0.202 n= 192 
 within  0.0292  
Note: * As from 2012 onwards the CPI is not comparable with the previous years (Gründler and 





Table 3 – Cross-section results (year: 2016) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 FracP FracP FracP FracP 2SLS 2SLS 
l.osi -0.132** -0.150*** -0.236***  -0.779*** -0.380*** 
 (0.055) (0.052) (0.053)  (0.247) (0.074) 
L3.osi    -0.243***   
    (0.057)   
l.logGDP -0.069*** -0.068*** -0.059*** -0.051*** -0.009 -0.046*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.025) (0.010) 
l.openness -0.037* -0.044** -0.039** -0.041** -0.085*** -0.050*** 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.014) 
l.political_rights -0.222*** -0.207*** -0.056 -0.079* 0.054 -0.033 
 (0.035) (0.038) (0.043) (0.042) (0.084) (0.047) 
l.easestartbus -0.073 -0.044 -0.038 -0.033 0.190 0.019 
 (0.074) (0.070) (0.060) (0.061) (0.119) (0.060) 
l.Catholics  0.070** 0.056* 0.043 0.043 0.051 
  (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.048) (0.035) 
l.Islamic  0.031 0.030 0.028 -0.006 0.024   (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.049) (0.032) 
l.Protestants  -0.141** -0.130** -0.120* -0.163** -0.121**   (0.060) (0.062) (0.063) (0.071) (0.051) 
l.pressfree   -0.616*** -0.522*** -0.973*** -0.720*** 
   (0.168) (0.156) (0.258) (0.166) 
# Countries 171 169 156 157 153 156 
R2 (or Pseudo R2) 0.0833 0.0862 0.0949 0.0948 0.624 0.776 
Log-pseudo likelihood -108.7 -107 -97.85 -98.47   





Under identification test     16.121 41.256 
Weak identificat. test F     7.402 99.109 
Hansen test (p-value)     0.388 0.947 
Notes: All models were esmated with dummies for connents and robust standard errors. 




Table 4 – Alternative measures of corruption: cross-section (2016), marginal effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: CCI CPI IC_ICRG PSCI 
OSI -0.236*** -0.175*** -0.217*** -0.147*  
(0.053) (0.047) (0.054) (0.089) 
# Countries 156 149 126 147 
Pseudo R2 0.0949 0.0907 0.0925 0.203 
Log-pseudo likelihood -97.85 -92.91 -78.96 -80.93 
Notes: All models were esmated by fraconal probit with robust standard errors and with the 
same set of independent variables as the model of column 3 in Table 3. Standard errors in 
parenthesis. Stascal significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5 – Panel Data Estimation Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
l.osi -0.024** -0.030*    
 (0.010) (0.016)    
l3.osi   -0.033***   
   (0.009)   
l.EGDI    -0.041**  
    (0.018)  
l.EPart     -0.007 
     (0.007) 
l.logGDP -0.057*** -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.057*** -0.058*** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
l.openness -0.008 0.001 -0.009 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
l.political_rights -0.090*** -0.083*** -0.081*** -0.089*** -0.091*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
l.pressfree  -0.024      (0.016)    
# Observations 1,386 1,092 1,217 1,386 1,386 
# Countries 179 164 179 179 179 
R2 (or Pseudo R2) 0.121 0.127 0.122 0.121 0.121 
Log-pseudo likelihood -843.9 -660.3 -740.4 -843.9 -843.9 
Notes: All models were estimated by Fractional Probit, with the year and country dummy 
variables and robust standard errors. Standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance: *** 




Table 6 – EU Digital Public Services indicators of e-government  








Digital pub. serv. 
for business 
l.e-gov indicator -0.192*** -0.075 -0.176* -0.190** 
 (0.049) (0.061) (0.094) (0.088) 
l.logGDP -0.170*** -0.160*** -0.143*** -0.145*** 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.024) (0.024) 
l.openness 0.013 0.015 0.012 0.017 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
l.political_rights -0.011 0.311 0.381 0.392 
 (0.176) (0.249) (0.246) (0.242) 
l.pressfree -0.769** -1.220*** -1.351*** -1.291*** 
 (0.346) (0.457) (0.416) (0.433) 
# Observations 78 84 84 84 
# Countries 26 28 28 28 
Pseudo R2 0.089 0.080 0.081 0.081 
Log-pseudo likelihood -42.85 -47.16 -47.11 -47.10 
Notes: The dependent variable is CCI. All models were estimated by the Fractional Probit with 
dummies for years and standard errors clustered by country. Standard errors in parentheses. 




Table 7 – High-income versus non-high-income countries 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 High income Non-high-income Full sample 
l.OSI -0.030* -0.032*** -0.031** 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.010) 
l.logGDP -0.039* -0.044*** -0.052*** 
 (0.022) (0.012) (0.010) 
l.openness -0.035*** -0.005 -0.009 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.006) 
l.political_rights -0.127** -0.091*** -0.088*** 
 (0.055) (0.014) (0.012) 
l.OSI*logGDP   [0.040]** 
   (0.019) 
Observations 355 1,031 1,386 
Countries 56 144 179 
Pseudo R2 0.121 0.0474 0.121 
Log-pseudo likelihood -179.3 -664.4 -843.9 
Notes: The dependent variables is CCI. All models were estimated with country and year fixed 
effects and robust standard errors. Standard errors in parenthesis. Fractional probit estimation 
coefficient in brackets. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 8 – Estimation results for Quantile regressions 
 q=0.25 q=0.5 q=0.75 
 (1) (2) (3) 
l.OSI -0.023 -0.026** -0.029* 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) 
l.logGDP -0.064*** -0.057*** -0.051*** 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) 
l.openness -0.001 -0.005 -0.010 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) 
l.political_rights -0.101*** -0.095*** -0.089*** 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.020) 
Notes: All models were estimated with country fixed effects, year dummies and robust standard 
errors. Quantile regressions with 1312 observations. Standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical 
significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figure 1 - Average marginal effects of l.OSI for different levels of GDP 
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Figure 2 - Average marginal effects of e-gov on different levels press freedom  
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